Abstrakt
INTRODUCTION
Many governments across the world provide extensive funding to their athletes in pursuit of success at international competitions such as the Olympic Games. The signifi cant increase in governmental resources fl owing into elite sports in recent decades has given rise to a number of questions among sport professionals and created a need for understanding the role of the state in elite sport (Figure 1. ). (De Bosscher, is Bottenburg, Shibli, Westerbeek, 2013) With the fact that the Hungarian government declared sport a strategic sector in 2010 while assigning signifi cant additional resources to this area (see Table 1, Table 4, Table 5 ), Hungary also joined the phenomenon of the global sporting arms race as described in the international literature (De Bosscher, Bingham, Shibli, Bottenburg, De Knop, 2008) . Percentage of the budget 0,33% 0,5% 0,45% 0.46% 0.44% 0.99%
Hungary has a long successful history in the Summer Olympics, although the performance of its commercialized global team sports has been decreasing radically in the past decades (Table 2, 3). Despite the strong political and social willingness to fi eld successful professional sports teams, the trend has not changed. This study attempts to describe the eff ect of governmental subsidization on professional sport's performance with the aim of understanding why a huge gap has emerged between successful elite sports and the popular but underperforming 'spectacular' teamsports (football, basketball, ice-hockey, handball, water polo). It is important to conceptualize this paradox properly in order to better understand the eff ect of the particular mechanisms in sport policies and to implement successful sport development policies (Sterbenz & Gulyás & Kassay, 2014) . The present study examines the eff ect of the changed role of Hungarian government in elite sport and the infl uence of the newly implemented political incentive on the behaviour of sport organizations. The nature of this study is descriptive, so our goal is not to evaluate the unprecedented level of support of the Hungarian government for sport, but rather to explore the principles for effi cient allocation of resources and to raise attention for the threats of the existing system.
Governmental sport fi nancing system in Hungary
The Hungarian government introduced a new corporate tax relief system (TRS) for the fi ve most popular team sports (football, basketball, ice-hockey, handball and water polo) to solve the fi nancing problems in 2010. This new method of sport funding has been authorized with an aim to use these additional resources primarily with the purposes of development of youth and sport facility investment.
Its introduction established a combination of coordination mechanisms. In this form, the market elements (fl ow of resources from businesses to sports organizations, for example, sponsorship) are mixed with the characteristics of bureaucratic coordination (decisions of actors standing in hierarchical relation determine the available limits). These together created a mixture, as business organizations can directly allocate a given part (70%) of their corporate income tax to sports organizations. In this system, a hierarchical bureaucratic coordination mechanism is used with the state and federation approval of sports development programs, while the company is paying like in the market coordination horizontally, but without the consideration their support to the sports organizations ( Figure 2 ). The federations set a quota based on the development programs used by the clubs, and the federations have a budget constraint set by the state (Table 4 ). The government introduced another funding construction for sixteen prioritized sports in 2013 to compensate for the emerging distortion between diff erent sports after the implementation of TRS. In addition, at the same time the state also undertook the debt of several sports federations as had previously happened two times in the 1990s (Table 5) . Previous studies have showed that as more countries have developed a strategic planning process for increasing their national elite sporting achievement, the return on investment has decreased for many nations (De Bosscher, Shilbury, Theeboom, Hoecke, De Knop 2011). The question raised at once weather this increasing invested amounts of money in the Hungarian elite sport it is enough for achieving greater elite sport success. On the other hand these new governmental fi nancing constructions were accompanied with a strong centralization process of the sport policy system which can be a serious threat for the professional team sports and can lead to ineffi ciency.
These kinds of structures were characterised by the Soviet-type economies (STE) where the incentive structure did not encourage cost minimization and innovation in the production sector but emphasised meeting output quotas (Eggertsson et al., 1990) . The hierarchical central management structure works best when: 1. fi nal outputs have relatively few quality dimensions; 2. the vertical phases of processing a commodity are few; 3. there are substantial economies of scale at the enterprise level; 4. the technology does not require horizontal linkages between enterprises with each unit acting as both supplier and purchaser of inputs.
To transform it to the sport sector we assume that hierarchical and bureaucratic coordination can be eff ective for the individual-based sport where production does not require horizontal linkage, but is measurable in objective and absolute terms, but not for professional team sport where the performance can be measured only in relative terms and it includes several uncertain factors (Sally & Anderson et al., 2014) .
The other problem is that such a signifi cant state funding is softening the budget constrain. The soft budget constraint is an economic concept originally formulated by Kornai (1979 Kornai ( , 1980a Kornai ( ,b, 1986 Kornai ( , 2003 . The SBC describes economic behaviour in socialist or post-socialist economies marked by ineffi ciency and shortage (Kornai et al., 2003) . Although the soft budget constraint is particularly persistent in socialist economies, it can also appear in other economic environments. The budget constraint refers to the behaviour of the decision-maker: he uses his budget, which he receives from selling his output, to cover his expenses (Kornai, 1986) . The soft budget constraint is appear when an organization faces the possibility of negotiating refi nancing, credits or subsidies ex post (Kornai et al., 2003 (Kornai et al., , p. 1104 , so the strict relationship between expenditure and earnings depreciate, deriving from the unenforceability of bankruptcy threats, together with various subsidies, credits, and price-supports (Kornai, 1979 (Kornai, , 1980a . Enterprises had strong chances for survival because they could always count on bailouts, which left their mark on their behaviour (Kornai et al., 2003) . Storm and Nielsen (2012, p. 191.) analysed the prevalence of the SBCs in the European professional football, and they stated the emergence and persistence of the SBC syndrome in professional sport is due to two main, interconnected factors: (1) the institutional mechanism of the sport market and (2) the social attachment to the clubs linked to the specifi c emotional logic of sport, which focuses on winning.
METHODS
A wide range of studies were conducted with the support of the Hungarian Olympic Committee in which the sixteen prioritized national sports federations (Athletics Boxing (amateur) Canoeing, Cycling, Rowing, Fencing, Gymnastics, Judo, Modern Pentathlon, Shooting, Swimming, Table tennis , Volleyball, Wrestling, Tennis, Skating) were analysed. Data collection was based on an overall organizational questionnaire including 48 items of 6 topics (Organization & Strategy; Development; Education; Support & Communication; Medical; and Facilities) with the involvement of the main stakeholders within national sport federations. The results of this survey were compared to the results of one of our former researches which examined the fi ve team sports which receive strong fi nancial support through the corporate tax relief system.
RESULTS
The conducted vocational audit has showed that on average over 70% of the revenues of the investigated sport federation are coming from governmental resources; most of the federations have vanishing sponsorship incomes. The historical results and recent successes show that the strong state funding for individual elite sport is an effi cient tool and we can confi rm our previous assumption.
In case of team sport's funding system the empirical evidences have pointed out that the introduced method involves many hazards in addition to solving the fi nancing problems.
Re-spreading of the SBC:
A failure to understand the upper fi nancial constraints of sport development programs is encouraging relevant actors in political bargaining and may lead to the re-spreading of soft budget constraints well known from the socialist planned economy. A lack of or a variable upper limit may result in the marginalization of the management responsible, since there is no "price" for the obtainable resources. This behaviour is particularly dangerous in an industry such as sports, where the actors become particularly susceptible to the irrational escalation trap with their participation in a sport competition (Mérő, 2013) . − Since bureaucratic relations distort the effi ciency of the price system (Hayek, 1976) , such a fi nancing model is spreading for sports which basically operate under a market coordination model, which breaks down performance-driven economic logic from the daily practice of the sports. According to Milgrom (1993) , the market system does not require the transmission of detailed information about resource availability, consumer preferences, or technological opportunities. The prices provide as much information as is needed, and the market system achieves eff ective coordination with much less communication of nonprice information than the centralized, planned system uses. − Sports organizations which are not aware of the constraint or continue softening it with political bargaining can abuse the support of fans, similar to the "too big to fail" phenomenon known from the banking world. Clubs whose operations are deemed 'too important' subject their stakeholders to the irresponsible practices of its management.' The functioning of the club is set as "too important" that the consequences of irresponsible management have been subjecting to them. The sports federations are not interested in the rigorous treatment, since the decisions (Board) are made by the sports organizations themselves.
The risk of the appearance of corruption:
Since control of TRS-fi nance is a bureaucratic type task as it is belonging to the government and sport federation, the fraud, the sources "infi ltration" of non-supported areas (professional players' salaries), and the expansion of corruption inevitably appear. The reduction of these could be realised with the tightening of controls and more severe penalties in the short-term, but cannot be removed due to the logic of the system. In contrast to the long-term results of youth development, short-term profi t maximization stands as a stronger motivation which will endanger the achievement of the TRS's objectives.
The crowding out eff ect of other revenue sources
The introduction of the resources from TRS appeared not only as additional resources as was hoped, but also as a substitution eff ect to replace previous revenues with the marginalization of sponsorship. The dangers of bureaucratic coordination are the depreciation of competition and the role of inventions, gaining of income without performance, shirking behaviour appear.
In case of rational decision-makers are expected to appear on the moral hazard phenomenon, these previously rationally behaving, frugal sports leaders will tend to change their behaviour. Deloitte, 2014; Muszbek, 2013) Muszbek's (2013) analysis about the economic situation of Hungarian football shows that the Hungarian top football league's fi ve-year cumulative loss is 34 million euros, and aside from 2010, a loss was made every year. Revenues are growing more slowly than costs, with an average annual loss of 25% of expenditures. An increasing proportion of income is coming from non-market-based resources, and in some cases, from the governmental budget or even public resources. Nearly two thirds of the spending (about 32 million euro) is labour cost (i. e. salary, commission fee). The clubs do not have a business strategy that seeks to achieve the level of international competitiveness in terms of budget (minimum 15 million EUR) as playing in the domestic league does not require on average 4 million euros of cost.
Rent-seeking
One of the important social impacts of government regulation is that actors are encouraged to change rules which are not favourable to them. Rent-seeking occurs when the benefi ts do not arise in a natural way (for example, changes in supply and demand), but are artifi cially created such as with state regulations, and competition starts to rise for the rent. In this case, the resources that the companies and organizations are spending to get the annuity are socially wasteful (Tollison, 1982) . In the case of TRS, the sport lobby completely and rationally strives to infl uence legislation for the success of rent-seeking, and this is particularly motivated for it because of the known time frames of the system. Because of the uncertainty surrounding this policy (the European Commission approved this method of sport fi nancing for the Hungarian government until 2017), the participants, contrary to the values of sport, are interested, rationally, in short-term revenue increases rather than in the operation of real sports development programs. For the development of youth it is essential to create a culture in which cooperation can be a dominant strategy against the competition.
CONCLUSION
Our study also confi rmed one of the main results obtained under the SPLISS research, which is that the increase in resources for sport does not lead to a clear improvement in sporting performance, and thus, does not support the competitiveness of elite sport. Hungary, with a state-funding dominant-system, seems to be more eff ective in the case of individualistic sports where a direct connection can be identifi ed between eff ort and performance. The same incentive system cannot be effi cient for team sports where several factors which increase the complexity of the sport can be identifi ed, so the trade-off between eff ort and performance is not so straightforward.
State funding can be effi cient for individual-based sports where performance is measurable in objective and absolute terms. On the contrary, in the case of team sports only the market is able to create such an asymmetric and hard fi nancing system which leads to an effi cient long-term usage of resources. The state has to take into account fairness as well. Further studies should be carried out regarding the relationship between state and market in terms of their fi nancing role in sport.
